Post Category → Venture Capital

Should VCs Control Your Startup’s Lawyers?

Related Reading: Negotiation is Relationship Building

With this being my 15th year as an Emerging Companies (“Startup”) lawyer, now as a partner at the country’s leading company-side boutique law firm in the space, I can say definitively that one of the defining questions of my career has been: Whom should a startup’s lawyers really work for?

To a fresh first-time entrepreneur who (naturally) doesn’t know what they don’t know, it seems like a stupid question. “Of course they work for me,” they’d say. Alas, if only life were so simple.

From a strictly legal standpoint, a startup’s lawyers can’t work solely for the founder CEO. Those lawyers work for the company (more specifically, the company’s owners), which of course include various constituencies on the cap table: founders, early employees, later-stage employees, investors of various cohorts (angels, VCs, private equity). More experienced founders understand this. They have fiduciary duties to the cap table, and ultimately a company’s lawyers need to track those fiduciary duties as well.

But beyond the legal technicalities, we get into the more subtle (yet enormously impactful) relationship dynamics of company governance and the advisors that fit into it. Lawyers are economically driven service providers and human beings. When they give advice – advice that can land in any number of places without ever being so off-base as to qualify as malpractice – that advice will be influenced by economic incentives in front of them. No one intelligent bites a hand that feeds them.

Who is going to be unhappy about (i.e. lose money) where lawyers’ advice lands? Could they potentially reward those lawyers for having their advice land in one place, and punish them if it lands elsewhere? Do not ever let yourself be so naive as to think smart lawyers don’t pay attention to these sorts of things.

How lawyers engage in “business development” is profoundly consequential as to how they ultimately advise companies. When they review a term sheet, or a board proposal, and advise first-time founders on what to negotiate, what to accept, how to respond, whether or not those lawyers have a relationship with the people on the other side of the table (so to speak) – the people with whom the company and executives are negotiating – matters. Big time.

Not once in my career have I ever killed a deal that a client did not want to die. But I have made some venture capitalists very angry (though not regularly), and I am proud of it. Because it is (literally) my job to do so when the context requires it.

Not to be a bulldog (not my style). Not to make mountains out of petty mole hills. But to recognize that, notwithstanding all the “founder friendly” PR fluff in VC’s (understandable) social media marketing, a ton of negotiation in startup law is inherently zero-sum. Every cap table adds up to 100%. There are only so many Board seats to go around. When the funds from an exit are flowing, they can only go into one bank account or another. When the executives and the investors disagree on a growth or exit strategy, someone’s preferences have to lose.

“But you’re not sticking to market standards.”

“But your lawyers are just running up your legal bill.”

“But these other lawyers I know and trust will get this deal done faster (and cheaper) for you.”

But but but.

Who decided what is “market standard?” Do you really think saving a few hundred or single-digit thousand dollars is worth never pushing back on issues that are extremely consequential for a company’s economics and power structure? Do you really think you can trust the advice of lawyers in negotiating across from VCs when those same lawyers have personally known those VCs for years, go to their holiday parties, and get a juicy pipeline of referral work from them?

Look, if you really think that, stop reading right now. Best of luck to you and yours. I have never wished to waste time selling services to people who are looking to buy something very different from what I (and we) do. If your perspective is that every startup lawyer just shuffles paper and fills in boxes, and all the better if they do it cheaper and faster than the next one (relationships, conflicts of interest, quality advisory, etc. be damned), good for you.

My career is where it is, and our firm exists, because plenty of elite entrepreneurs understand that this is not a game. That throwing around empty terms like “market standard” is often just a pressure tactic to get inexperienced founders to shut up and do what clever investors want. That lawyers who are independent from the VC community are going to advise startups in very different high-impact ways; ways more aligned with the interests of common stockholders deeply invested (financially and emotionally) in one specific company instead of diversified investors maximizing a VC portfolio.

The smartest entrepreneurs understand the “equalizing” role that experienced startup lawyers play in company governance and negotiations, because VCs are virtually always far more experienced than the founding team. The VCs will always have their own hired lawyers, and the company needs to have its own independent lawyers (who cannot be influenced by counterparties wielding future business opportunities) to close information asymmetries.

Smart founders also understand that when the stakes are high and interests are misaligned, relationships matter, including relationships impacting the advice that lawyers give (or fail to give). If you don’t know what you don’t know, you need advisors around you actually willing to tell you what you don’t know, even if someone else in the room (smiles and friendly conversation notwithstanding) would prefer that you not know it.

If VCs have a “preferred” set of lawyers to suggest to you for representing your startup, why exactly do you think they “prefer” those lawyers? What exactly do you think those lawyers offer those VCs in return for those “trusted” referrals?

So I ask you: Should your VCs control your startup’s lawyers? Think hard.

Seed-Stage Startups Should Shrink Their Option Pools

Background reading:

You only get 100% of your cap table to give away (or keep), and the sad fact is founders make all sorts of tactical errors that needlessly give up points to investors and other parties. Sometimes those errors are driven by bad advice offered by misaligned participants in the ecosystem.

One example I’ve written extensively about is the aggressive anti-dilution mechanism built into YC’s default Post-Money SAFE Template. YC portrays its template as a wonderful legal fees-saving “standard” for founders, while staying quiet about its extremely harsh economics that amplify founder dilution. YC is, at the end of the day, a VC that benefits from making founders dilute more. So be skeptical about using their templates without any modification.

The reality is SAFEs are tweaked/modified all the time, and it costs essentially nothing in legal fees to do so. In that above-linked post I offer a very simple – just a few sentences – tweak to eliminate this issue, while preserving the post-money valuation mechanism that provides transparency on how much of the cap table a SAFE is purchasing.

Another issue I wrote about over ten years ago is how founders needlessly reserve too large of an option pool at formation. They’ll just pick a number, like 20% or 10%, and reserve that amount, regardless of what they actually intend to use. They think this costs them nothing, but it’s just not true.

First, most employee new hire equity grants are made based on a % of the fully-diluted capitalization. When you offer them 2% or 3%, the denominator of that percentage includes the reserved but unused pool. It’s simple math that if you reserved too large of a pool, you are needlessly giving them more of the cap table than you otherwise would have. If you had reserved a smaller pool up-front, the 2% or 3% would be of a smaller pie, and then in expanding the pool later (which you can always do), the employee dilutes alongside everyone else.

Second, reserving too large of a pool makes it easier for VCs to argue for a needlessly large pool in your first equity round. As I wrote before:

“The pool you reserve before your first VC financing will set the baseline for negotiating how much of an option pool “top up” VCs make founders absorb.”

If your pool is at 5% going into a funding round and your VCs are negotiating for a 10% or 15% pool post-closing, it’s going to show up as a very large increase. The optics of that increase will help you in negotiation. But if you start with a 10% or 15% pool that you didn’t even need, the increase will look much smaller, which means you basically made the VC’s job easier for zero benefit to yourself.

The above two issues are not new in my writings. Stop reserving too large of a pool at formation, because it ends up giving too much equity to employee/consultant/advisor hires via equity grant calculations, and to VCs via equity round negotiations.

A somewhat newer issue that I want to emphasize here: Post-Money SAFEs make it even more costly to have an artificially large pool, given how their conversion math works. Shrink your pool to as small as possible before your SAFEs convert.

The definition of “Company Capitalization” in the Post-Money SAFE (which is the denominator for purposes of SAFE conversion) includes the pool existing before the equity round, but excludes the pool increase negotiating with your new lead VC(s).

Thus by having a pointlessly large pool at the time of SAFE conversion, you are just handing money to the SAFE holders. Shrink the pool before SAFE conversion to only exactly what you need, and the full pool increase of the equity round will NOT drop the SAFEs conversion price.

I’m not going to show specific examples of the math here. You can use the Open Startup Model (free) if you don’t have your own excel model. Suffice to say based on a few examples I’ve modeled out, you can reduce the amount of dilution your SAFE holders take, in most scenarios, by about 10% or more. Free money.

So the costs of having a pointlessly large equity pool before an equity round continue to mount:

  1. It means you’re giving too much equity to new hires.
  2. It means you’re making the job of your VCs in your equity round easier by front-loading an option pool increase they would otherwise need to argue for themselves.
  3. It means your SAFE holders are getting more shares from their SAFE conversion than is actually necessary.

Stop. Reserving. Stupidly. Large. Option. Pools. The emergence of AI probably means hiring needs, and associated equity pool needs, are going to shrink anyway.

At formation, reserve only what you think you will need for the next 6 months or so. And before you start negotiating an equity round, shrink your pool to cover only what has actually been used. This will save you multiple percentage points on your cap table that could be worth millions in the long-run. Again, free money. Take it.

Pre-Seed Funding with Post-Money SAFEs: Revisited in 2024

There are few markets that evolve faster than the world of startups, for unsurprising reasons. I figured it was time to revisit some of my writings on seed and pre-seed funding given how much the market has evolved since 2019-2021, when I last wrote about this topic in depth.

First, a brief history:

1990s – Long before the term “pre-seed” was even a thing, before the SaaS revolution made it even conceivable to start building a tech company with only a few hundred thousand dollars (or less), almost all early startup funding occurred as a complex preferred stock round; what now is reserved for Series A and larger seed rounds. It was a very different world from today.

Early 2000s  – Then convertible notes, once reserved mostly for “bridge” rounds in between preferred stock financings, started being used for seed funding; a natural evolution for rounds that were getting smaller and couldn’t justify full equity round negotiation time or costs. It worked relatively well. We also saw in this era the emergence of “series seed” preferred stock templates, a slimmed-down version of the more complex NVCA, that allowed you to raise a seed equity round for about 40-50% less in legal fees. These also got a decent amount of traction.

2013 – Then the Pre-Money SAFE, which is a convertible note without interest or maturity (effectively) was released around 2013. Founders started (candidly) abusing that instrument by raising Pre-Money SAFEs for years and years while obscuring the real economics behind what angel investors were funding. This was do-able because if your second, third, or fourth SAFE round has a pre-money valuation cap, but nothing capping the post–money, your newest investors can’t really know what % of the company their investment is buying without making you model out all the conversion math.

They could, for example, be putting in $1 million at a $49 million pre-money cap, which would suggest a $50 million post-money valuation, but they were in fact getting way less than 2% of the business because numerous unmodeled earlier SAFE rounds were pushing up the post-money. The post-money valuation is what really hardens a startup investor’s ownership percentage.

2018 – In late 2018 Y Combinator released the Post-Money SAFE. It flipped the economics of SAFEs to have a post-money cap, making the % purchased by investors far more transparent and immune to this issue of companies obscuring a deal’s economics. This was a good development, and the Post-Money model of valuation caps has since gained substantial market share.

But there’s one very big problem. The solution YC devised went much further – to the benefit of investors (including themselves) –  than was necessary to let investors know what % of the cap table they are buying on the day they invest. It further promised those investors complete non-dilutability of that percentage until the SAFE converts, including through subsequent SAFE rounds with higher valuation caps. This makes the Post-Money SAFE far harsher economically (to founders) than any other instrument in the history of startup finance.

YC itself has made an enormous amount of money by implementing this new math into the deal it gets with its own accelerator’s startups. I’ve seen YC companies start with giving 7% (the usual deal) to YC, but by the time the SAFE actually converts, after two or three more convertible rounds, the YC % is functionally equivalent to having received 10% or more years earlier. The smartest YC companies get ahead of this issue and raise a seed equity round as soon as they can after exiting the accelerator, cutting off this problem by converting all their SAFEs, but most don’t. It ends up costing them dearly.*

That’s the history.

2024 – Today, pre-seed and seed rounds have evolved such that you very rarely see an equity round that is smaller than $3-5 million. Many companies raise more than $5-10 million as convertibles (SAFEs or Notes) before doing an equity round.

Given the current landscape and investor expectations, we typically advise founders to not swim too hard against the tide, but also not mindlessly drink the overly “standard” Kool-Aid. Yes, templates like the Post-Money SAFE have gained significant market share, but what you don’t hear as much in the (simplified) data is that they are still being negotiated, particularly on the anti-dilution economics issue discussed above.

Many founders are very uncomfortable with promising their SAFE holders anti-dilution for years, given how equity rounds have been pushed further into companies’ growth. Six years after the Post-Money SAFE’s release I still have not heard a logical argument for why if a startup successfully closes $X million as preferred stock, all prior investors get diluted (what normally happens), but if it happens to be a SAFE round (same valuation, same amount raised), no investors get diluted. Why is the paperwork structure of the round relevant to whether investors get diluted?

Many smart founders modify the Post-Money SAFE (lightly) to address the investor-biased anti-dilution issue. I posted a public redline for this years ago, available here, along with other info on the economic implications of making this modification. Changing just a few words in the Post-Money SAFE can, for a company that achieves at least a $100 million exit, amount to millions of dollars in the pockets of common stockholders (founders, employees) instead of VCs or accelerators. Anyone who thinks at least trying to make this change isn’t worth it, out of some fear of “friction” – isn’t (IMO) defending their cap table enough.

Remember that this modification still promises investors the cap table percentage that the post-money valuation cap implies. If they put in $1 million at a $10 million post-money cap they are getting 10% today, effectively. What the “fix” does, however, is ensure that 10% shrinks pro-rata if you do a new SAFE round in 6-12 months with a higher valuation cap. Because that’s what would happen if you’d raised that $1 million as an equity round instead, or as a convertible note or pre-money capped SAFE. This idea of promising non-dilution to SAFE investors was completely novel, unnecessary, and introduced by YC, costing founders a lot of money. 

Of the founders I observe actually trying to fix the Post-Money SAFEs problems, a material number (but not all) have it accepted by their investors. They send a simple markup early in the process, a little discussion happens, and investors either OK it or they don’t. It ultimately comes down to leverage, which no lawyer can change for you.

For founders unable or unwilling to push for this change, other possibilities are:

A. At a minimum understand the anti-dilution issue, and factor it into your modeling of subsequent rounds. View future SAFE dilution as stacked on top of what was previously given to SAFE investors. The earlier SAFE holders are not themselves being diluted, which means you (the founders) are being diluted more. Your valuation caps in future SAFE rounds thus need to be higher to account for the more aggressive founder dilution.

B. We’ve also seen some founders, instead of tweaking the Post-Money SAFE, simply switch back to an old school pre-money formula. I personally find this a bit awkward in the context of investor expectations of 2024, but it certainly happens sometimes.

C. Convert your SAFEs as soon as possible. This is the advice I give to YC founders, and the advice I give to anyone who has raised a substantial amount of money on unnegotiated Post-Money SAFEs. Cut the anti-dilution off as soon as you can by raising a seed equity round, even a small one. See my article Myths and Lies About Seed Equity Rounds to dispel any boogeyman stories you’ve heard about how equity shouldn’t be used until Series A.

Those stories are often driven by investors holding post-money SAFEs, who make way more money staying unconverted and therefore undiluted even as you raise more money and increase in valuation. Investors can be great sources of advice, but they are not your best friends. Cap tables are unavoidably a zero-sum game, and investors’ advice is very often designed to maximize the amount they get. Watch incentives.

Startup finance continues to evolve. Templates are useful as starting points of a negotiation. They’ve dramatically streamlined the earliest stages of funding, as the number of pre-seed and seed funds (and deals) has exploded. But be skeptical of anyone suggesting that those templates are never negotiable. They most certainly (often) are. The tiniest amount of negotiation can save you and your team millions of dollars. Don’t foolishly leave money on the table.

If you’re raising a pre-seed or seed round, feel free to reach out to us. We often do virtual office hours to help founders better understand these granularities as applied to their market context.

Post-script: After you’ve closed on Post-Money SAFEs, shrink your option pool to save on dilution. Having an unnecessarily large option pool before your SAFEs convert is just handing extra equity to your SAFE holders for no good reason.

*YC will not modify their own Post-Money SAFE for their cohort of accelerator companies. The only way to minimize the economic harshness of its terms is to raise a small equity round as soon as possible after YC to convert their SAFE.