How Much Seed Rounds Cost – Lowering Fees and Expenses Safely

TL;DR: There are effective and efficient ways to lower your closing costs, in terms of legal fees and other expenses, for your seed round. But be mindful of the lean v. cheap distinction. A lot of founders myopically over-cut corners thinking that minimizing negotiation or deal structuring saves them money. This can easily cost 10-20x+ long-term in terms of economics (dilution) and governance power, because teams end up mindlessly signing terms against their interests. Thoughtful customization, combined with lean process and tools, gets you to a better outcome. Thinking lean – balancing flexibility, optimization, and efficiency – but not short-sightedly cheap, protects you from being penny wise but pound foolish.

Related reading:

There are two broad categories of costs for closing a seed round:

  • Legal Fees – Including whether you are using an incumbent “BigLaw” firm or a leaner boutique, and how you structure the round.
  • Post-Closing Expenses – Including state and securities filing fees, as well as 409A/cap table software costs

Seed Round Legal Fees

BigLaw v. Elite Boutique?

Without a doubt the two most significant drivers of legal fees are: (1) the type of law firm you are using, and (2) the round structure (contracts) you and your lead investors choose.  For a deep-dive on the “type of law firm” issue, see: Startup Legal Fee Cost Containment (Safely). In short, what has happened over the last decade or so is the incumbent Silicon Valley-based firms (BigLaw) have raised their pricing and grown so bloated (IMO) that they have simply overshot the needs of a huge segment of the startup ecosystem, especially at the earlier stages.

Granted, the market has historically not done a very good job of offering viable, credible alternatives to BigLaw in this space. What we’ve more often seen is (what I lovingly call) “shit firms” full of cheap but poorly-qualified lawyers, or peddlers of half-baked legal automation software that simply can’t handle the contextual nuances of high-growth companies. Lean but still elite boutique law firms, like Optimal (our firm), offer a more balanced package of highly-trained and credible professionals, including top-tier Partners, but lower costs derived from a more efficient firm operating structure.

To put this into more concrete numbers: a Partner in an incumbent “BigLaw” SV-based law firm will typically cost at least $900-1400 per hour, often more. At an elite lean boutique firm, the Partner will have an extremely similar background in terms of credentials, training, and experience, but be more like $450-650 per hour. Certainly not cheap – remember Partners don’t do most of the work in early-stage, they oversee things (quality control) and strategize with the C-suite and Board – but dramatically leaner than BigLaw. What allows leaner law firms to do this, while retaining top talent, is that they “burn” so much less money than firms built on traditional operating models. They can pay lawyers extremely well, but at lower rates.

Convertibles (Note or SAFE) v. Equity (Seed Equity or NVCA)?

The second big driver of legal fees in a seed round is the contract structure you and your investors use. Certain market players like to pretend as if this decision is very easy and simple, often because they make money nudging you in one direction, but it really is not that universal or clean cut.

Convertible instruments (convertible notes or SAFEs) are most certainly cheaper to close on and negotiate. Even within that category, however, there are key nuances. For example, whether there’s a valuation cap or not, whether that valuation cap is post-money v. pre-money, and of course whether you’re using convertible debt (notes) or SAFEs. Good reading on this: SAFEs v. Convertible Notes and A “Fix” for Post-Money SAFEs. These nuances can have enormously consequential (economically) impacts on a company.

While the big positive of convertible notes and SAFEs is speed and simplicity, their primary downside is uncertainty. They do not harden economics or governance rights the way that an equity round does, but instead deliberately punt on various hard questions to the future –  this is precisely how they simplify things. In many cases, this is a feature and not a bug, but not always. A huge number of startups are feeling these downsides in this heavy post-pandemic post-ZIRP economic downturn that the ecosystem is experiencing.

So many founders drank the “click click close” kool-aid suggesting that seed rounds are all “standard” and they should just sign YC’s default post-money SAFE. The main peddlers of this perspective were specific investors, who profited from pushing a contract structure designed for their economic interests, and automated financing companies who need you to not negotiate your deals, and believe it’s all “boilerplate,” so that you can let their software tool close everything for you. Obviously, automation software breaks down when confronted with any meaningful level of flexibility or structure nuance.

Now that these startup teams need to raise more money in hard times, they’re feeling the pain of having failed to do a bit more negotiation up-front, including by hardening investor economics when valuations were higher instead of simply relying on a moving valuation cap with no floor. The harsh anti-dilution mechanics of YC’s default SAFE are also imposing significant dilution on founders, whereas if they had just done a tad more thinking and structuring up-front they could’ve saved themselves potentially tens of millions of dollars worth of dilution. Losing millions in dilution in order to save a few thousand in fees is a perfect example of penny-wise, pound-foolish judgment.

See Myths about Seed Equity Rounds for a deep-dive into when equity, instead of a convertible, can make sense for your seed round. Choosing a simplified “seed equity” structure, instead of the longer, more complex NVCA-based equity deal contracts, can save tens of thousands in legal fees, and safely (without material hidden risks). You and your counsel will just need to get your investors comfortable with it, if possible.

Concrete Legal Fee Numbers:

If you’re using a lean elite boutique law firm, closing a convertible note or SAFE round is at most a few thousand dollars in legal fees ($2.5K-$5K). A little more if it’s heavily negotiated, but rarely more than $10K. BigLaw, with often double the rates, will naturally be more. This is for company-side costs. Investors usually pay their own fees in convertible rounds.

For simplified seed equity (not NVCA), a more typical range from a boutique law firm is $15K-$25K if we’re thinking of a 10%-90%-ile range, with below that range being zero negotiation super-fast closing, and above that range being when more heavy negotiation or cleanup diligence issues are involved. Again, BigLaw with its higher rates is probably twice that.

Some VCs will insist on structuring “seed rounds” in the exact same format as a Series A, using NVCA-based forms. This adds significant complexity and drafting time, as it’s a rejection of the simplified seed equity structure. For this structure, with a lean boutique a reasonable 10/90 range is $25K-$45K assuming the round is $4-6 million-ish raised. A larger round closer to $10M+ or higher may be closer to $50K due to more legal work demanded by the VCs, and will look more like a Series A. Again, BigLaw’s rates will drive that higher if you go that route. Often 2x. But importantly, a small minority of seed rounds are structured this way, as using this structure is more a response to a particular fund’s idiosyncratic preferences, and not some inherent necessity of seed financing.

Only perhaps 10-15% of these cost ranges boil down to what might be called “administrative” work – paralegal-esque mechanics like coordinating signatures, inputting numbers, etc. The real drivers are high-impact legal work of negotiation (including educating executives and Boards), structuring, drafting, and integration of the “code” (contract language) for the deal and planned corporate governance arrangement.

Sidenote to law firms: See Legal Tech for Startup Lawyers for some experienced advice on helpful software for reducing administrative time on financings. 

The key takeaway is how much seed rounds cost to close is heavily driven by the type of law firm you’re using, and the contract structure. My point here is not to pretend there is some formulaic, straightforward answer as to what any particular company should choose. It depends on context. My suggestion, however, is that founders actually act like executives and exercise some judgment – weighing the pros and cons, balancing flexibility v. speed, negotiation v. automation – instead of biting into X or Y peddler’s nonsense as to whatever a “standard” seed round looks like. We’re talking here about selling 10-30% of your cap table. Don’t be a myopic fool.

Other Seed Round Expenses

While not as meaningful as legal fees, there are a few other expenses that still impact the bottom line in a seed round. State filing fees, along with securities filings, can run you anywhere from $750-2,000 as a 10/90 range.

Carta or Pulley?

Higher than state or filing fees will be the cost of adopting capitalization table software and getting a 409A valuation; the latter of which is usually recommended if you intend to grant options after closing your round. Before a seed round, adopting any kind of cap table tool apart from MS Excel has always struck me as pointless. At under 10-20 cap table stakeholders, it’s not hard for a competent team, in collaboration with competent counsel, to maintain a spreadsheet. In fact, when very early founders introduce third-party cap table software into the mix, I sometimes see more mistakes, not fewer ones.

Historically, Carta has been the big incumbent player in this space, and deservedly so. But as is the case with many incumbents, there are growing concerns in the market about feature creep and excessive (rising) pricing. Sentiments like:

A big concern among law firms and VCs has been that no other leaner alternatives seemed to be gaining sufficient market share to counteract the network effect advantages that Carta has. But from what we’ve been observing, Pulley (Founders Fund Series B-funded) appears to be reaching a threshold where, at a minimum, founders need to be aware of them as a significantly less costly and simpler cap table + 409A option to the tune of thousands of dollars per year. Most serious law firms in this space are growing comfortable and familiar with it. Its simpler, more focused interface is certainly helpful.

We also published The Open Startup Model for founders who (understandably) want to avoid the cost of a third-party capitalization tool entirely until later in their company’s trajectory. A lot of lean companies get by just fine during seed stage, and sometimes even Series A, relying on a simple but well-organized excel model.

Summary

All smart founding teams are rightfully concerned about not over-spending to close their seed funding. But there’s a lot of opaque, and sometimes patently false, information available in the market as various commentators “talk their book” instead of laying out all the factors honestly.

On legal fees, law firm type and deal structure are big drivers. For the former, it’s BigLaw v. elite boutique. For the latter, the decision matrix is multi-variate. If convertibles: SAFE or Note, and within those categories, type of valuation cap. If equity: simplified seed equity or NVCA. Where you land on deal structure has millions of dollars in implications long-term. Take the time to exercise real judgment on this issue. Remember: lean, not cheap.

On post-closing cap tables and 409As, Carta is the quite expensive but solid incumbent, and Pulley is the increasingly attractive lean alternative. Assess both. Also consider just leaning on an Excel-based cap model.

Good luck.

Post-Money Valuation Cap Convertible Note Template

Link: Post-Money Valuation Capped Convertible Note Template

See also: Seed Round Template Library

Post-money (as opposed to conventional pre-money) valuation caps have become more of a thing in early-stage startup convertible rounds. The primary benefit of a post-money cap is that it makes it clearer to investors what percentage of the cap table they are purchasing as of the day of their investment, because the “all-inclusive” valuation cap incorporates all SAFEs and/or Notes the company has raised, even if they haven’t been formally converted or modeled on the cap table. In pre-money caps, what you are buying is more ambiguous.

The extra transparency of post-money caps can be a very good thing. But as I’ve written before, and many others have pointed out, the default post-money SAFE that YC published a few years ago had a very anti-founder “gotcha” built into it. Not only did it commit to a specific % of the cap table today, but it also gave investors aggressive anti-dilution protection for any future dilution from more SAFES or Notes, all the way until an equity round in which everything converts. Tons of companies have gotten burned by this, not understanding that YC’s Post-Money SAFE structure forces the common stock alone to absorb all dilution until SAFEs convert. This is way worse economically than other financing structures for early-stage.

Frankly, YC’s decision to make its SAFE instrument so investor friendly was surprising, even acknowledging that they, as investors, surely have benefited financially from it. Giving post-closing anti-dilution protection to SAFE investors isn’t necessary at all to give them the real primary benefit of a post-money cap, which is clarity as to what they are buying today. If I’m investing into a company that already has raised some SAFEs or Notes, I surely would like a hardened commitment as to what post-money valuation I’m paying for today, but I don’t see why I should expect protection from future dilution. For that reason, we published a “fixed” post-money SAFE template. With a few added words (clearly reflected in track changes for transparency), it “fixes” this anti-dilution problem in the YC template.

Acknowledging the benefits of even a “fixed” post-money SAFE, the truth is a lot of investors around the world, and in the U.S., still aren’t comfortable with SAFEs. They think SAFEs generally skimp too much on investor protection. For example, particularly in a down market like today, some investors would prefer the debt treatment of a convertible note. Even in 2023, we still see quite a few deals closed on convertible notes instead of SAFEs. I represent exactly zero VCs or tech investors, and what I’ll say on this topic is that in reality the differences between SAFEs and Notes are not super material; and never worth losing funding over them. Go with whatever works, and just make sure you have good advisors to protect you on more material points.

Most convertible notes I see today still use the older-style of pre-money valuation cap. There’s no reason why founders, in choosing to raise on a convertible note, should be stuck only with pre-money valuation caps, given that, as I described above, there can be very good reasons for using a post-money structure.

For that reason, I’ve taken the convertible note template that’s historically been publicly available here on SHL, and made a post-money valuation cap version. The benefits of a post-money valuation cap’s clarity, but under a convertible note structure. Just one more potential template to leverage in closing an early-stage round. Importantly, it does not have YC’s harsh anti-dilution mechanisms built in. The purpose of this post-money cap is to reassure investors as to what they are investing in today. There is no promise of anti-dilution for future fundraises because, in my opinion, there shouldn’t be.

The usual disclaimers apply here. This is just a template, and it is intended for use with experienced counsel. I am not recommending that founders use this template on their own without experienced advisors. If you choose to do so, do not blame me for any negative consequences.

Related recommended reading: Myths and Lies about Seed Equity. As useful as SAFEs and Convertible Notes are for simple early-stage fundraising, my impression is that they tend to get over-used, sometimes in contexts when an equity round really makes a lot more sense. Make sure you understand the full pros and cons of an equity round, including potential “seed equity” structures that are simpler and cheaper to close than full “NVCA” equity docs. A lot of the over-use of Notes and SAFEs stems from myths and falsehoods often shared in the market about equity deals.

A Fix for Post-Money SAFEs: The Math and a Redline

TL;DR: The default language of a Post-Money SAFE has the worst possible economics for founders in the vast majority of seed round contexts, because any future convertible rounds (that aren’t equity) force dilution entirely on the common stock (seed investors aren’t diluted at all – YC benefits significantly from this language in its own investments). A very small tweak to the language can save founders/common stockholders millions of dollars, and make the Post-Money SAFE fairer to the cap table.

Background reading: Why Startups Shouldn’t Use YC’s Post-Money SAFE

First, a very quick review of the high-level economic problem with the Post-money SAFE structure that YC promoted a few years ago; and which is only in recent quarters becoming more visible to founders as their seed rounds start to convert:

The stated value proposition of the post-money SAFE, relative to the traditional pre-money SAFE, was that it delivered investors far more clarity over how much of the cap table they were buying. If they put in $1 million on a $10 million post-money SAFE, they were buying 10% of the company today, regardless of what the current cap table looks like. This is actually a good thing. Clarity is great.

The hidden value proposition for investors of the post-money SAFE, and which has cost founders enormously by not understanding its implicationswas an extreme level of anti-dilution protection built into the post-money SAFE. Any SAFEs or notes that you issue after the post-money SAFE round, but before a Series A, do not dilute the investors; they dilute only the common stock (founders and employees). This is the case even if the 2nd or 3rd round of SAFEs is an up-round with a higher valuation cap.

This was and remains crazy, and totally unnecessary in light of the stated purpose of post-money SAFEs; which was for investors to know what they are buying on the day of their closing. When you buy equity you are able to calculate the ownership you are purchasing at closing, but equity rounds virtually never, not even in the most investor-slanted deals, have full anti-dilution protection for post-closing investment. Why should Post-Money SAFEs give investors that? They shouldn’t, and this was an egregious (but in my opinion, deliberately obfuscated) over-step in startup financing template design.

We posted here a very simple redline (in track changes) of what needs to be edited on YC’s post-money SAFE to eliminate the terrible anti-dilution mechanics. Again, it’s worth emphasizing that this redlined safe still gives investors the stated benefit of the post-money structure, which is to know what % of the cap table they are getting as of their closing. What it changes is that it makes post-closing issuances proportionately dilutive to both founders and investors, just as they would (and should) be in any other kind of financing structure.

There are numerous different ways someone could draft a “fix” to this problem. I’m just posting a simple public redline so founders, lawyers, and investors understand the problem, and can either go with this solution, or craft a variant that works for their context.

A colleague of mine also designed a very helpful model (in Google Sheets) breaking down the mathematical (economic) differences between a typical pre-money SAFE, post-money SAFE, and our suggested redlined post-money SAFE. We know engineers in particular love seeing the numbers.

To give a high-level idea of the economic implications, assuming the following:

SAFE Round 1: $5M pre-money cap or $6.5M post-money cap ($1.5M invested)

SAFE Round 2: $10M pre-money cap or $12M post-money cap ($2M invested)

Series A round: $25M pre-money, $31M post-money ($6M new money), 10% post-available pool.

In Series A dollars (company value as of Series A closing), common stockholders lose $912,000 in moving from the traditional pre-money SAFE to YC’s preferred post-money SAFE. Fast-forward to an exit years later, and you’re talking easily millions or even tens of millions of dollars in lost value from simply changing the template.

Again in Series A dollars, common stockholders gain appx. $1.2 million in using the redlined post-money SAFE relative to YC’s post-money SAFE. The addition of just a few extra clarificatory words (which eliminate the hidden anti-dilution protections for investors) shift $1.2 million in Series A value from investors to the common stock; which again could easily be >$10 million by exit. All with just a few tweaks of language.

If this isn’t clear already: the stakes here are extremely high. And anyone suggesting that mindlessly using an investor or accelerator’s preferred templates is “saving” founders money (by reducing legal fees) is either hilariously uninformed, or lying out of their teeth. Tread carefully, and stay well-counseled.

Disclaimer: The model presented above is purely a hypothetical based on general math mechanics of SAFE and Series A rounds. The specific outcome in your company’s case will be dependent on the facts and circumstances, and you should always use experienced, trusted advisors to avoid missteps.  

A Friends & Family (F&F) SAFE Financing Template

TL;DR: An uncapped, discounted SAFE with a special (not conventional) “Super MFN” provision that allows your F&F investors to get a discounted (from your seed round) valuation cap is the best and fairest structure for most friends and family rounds, but none of the public SAFE templates provide for this concept. Uncapped SAFEs are typically designed to provide a discount only on a future equity round (not future convertible round), which means the discount won’t apply if the round after your F&F is another convertible round. Use an F&F SAFE instead to ensure your F&F investors get a fair deal, but you avoid the downsides of setting a valuation too early. This is also the exact structure that most of our clients use for “bootstrapping” investments (from founders into their own companies).

Note: If you’d like to discuss this template or F&F Financings generally, try Office Hours.

Background reading:

For true seed rounds, convertible notes and SAFEs (preferably pre-money, and not post-money, SAFEs) are both viable options, along with equity.

However, for friends and family (F&F) rounds – the first and usually “friendliest” money in the door – there are very good reasons to utilize a SAFE. First, your friends and family are unlikely to be insistent on significant investor protections (like debt treatment), and so they are likely to accept whatever reasonable instrument you ask them to sign. Second, because your F&F round occurs very early in the company’s history, it may be outstanding and unconverted for a long time; which makes having a maturity date of a convertible note more risky.

The problem is that all the SAFE templates currently out there aren’t really well-structured for an F&F round.

Valuation Cap SAFEs – In the case of SAFEs with valuation caps (the most common), an F&F round often occurs so early in the company’s life that setting a valuation is fraught with excessive risk. If you set it too high, you can create unrealistic expectations, and your first true professional round (seed) may end up being a “down round.” If you set it too low (often the case), it can “anchor” the valuation that your seed investors are willing to pay; they’ll question why they should pay X multiples of what your F&F got. We generally recommend that companies avoid valuation caps in their F&F rounds. Whatever you end up picking will just be a random guess anyway. Wait to set any valuations until serious investors are at the table, so they can provide a realistic market check.

Uncapped, Discount SAFEs – Conventional uncapped “discount only” SAFEs are often also a poor fit for an F&F round, because the discount applies only to a future equity round. In the vast majority of cases, your first serious financing after an F&F round will itself be a convertible round (note or SAFE), and so the conventional discount in this SAFE won’t apply. Your F&F may end up getting only a 20% discount on your Series A price, which is quite disproportionate if they invested years before the closing of your Series A round.

MFN SAFEs – The only other public template alternative is a conventional “MFN” (most favored nation) SAFE. This effectively gives your F&F the right to get the same deal that your seed investors get. But is that really fair? If your friends and family invested a year before your seed round investors, before you hit significant milestones, shouldn’t they get a better economic deal than your seed?

Better: an F&F SAFE – For this reason, we’ve found a modified SAFE to be the most logical structure. We’ve taken a conventional SAFE, and added an extra concept to ensure that an MFN provision gives your F&F a discount on the valuation cap that your seed investors get. So, for example, if your seed investors invest in a convertible note with a $10 million valuation cap, this “super MFN” provision will amend the F&F SAFEs to provide an $8 million cap (assuming a 20% discount is provided for). Thus with this structure your F&F get the best deal on the cap table, but you avoid all the downsides of setting a valuation cap too early in the company’s history.

Important note: the F&F SAFE Template can also be an excellent way for founders to paper their own cash investments in their companies. In all cases, consult with counsel before relying on any public template, including this one.

The F&F SAFE Template can be downloaded here.

Myths and Lies about Seed Equity for Seed Rounds

TL;DR: The release of the Post-Money SAFE structure, which is the worst possible way to raise seed money for most startups, has incentivized seed investors to perpetuate various myths and lies about alternatives (particularly about seed equity), in order to push founders to accept bad economics. Founders need to look past the spin and self-interested advice, to ensure they are assessing all the variables clearly.

The fundraising advice that vocal investors, many with blogs and twitter accounts, give to first-time founders often closely tracks their own incentives and self-interest. For example, a few years ago before the creation of the Post-Money SAFE, many early-stage investors complained that Pre-Money SAFEs had all kinds of problems, and that founders should strongly consider equity for their seed rounds. That was, of course, because Pre-Money SAFEs were very company (founder) friendly from an economic and governance rights standpoint, and those investors got more of the cap table by hardening their positions via an equity round with extra rights.

But now that YC has taken it upon itself to promote the Post-Money SAFE, which has terrible economics for companies/founders and is great for early-stage investors, suddenly the narrative has flipped. Now many of those same investors sing the praises of SAFE rounds, and have spun all kinds of myths and lies about why seed equity is apparently now such a terrible structure. The point of this post is to dispel some of those myths and lies.

Myth / Lie #1In an equity round you have to give investors a board seat.

Simple, you don’t. There’s nothing inherent in doing an equity round that requires giving investors a Board (of Directors) seat, and we’ve seen plenty of equity rounds that don’t. On the flip side, some SAFE and convertible note rounds will involve giving a Board seat to investors. Whether or not giving investors a Board seat in your seed round is appropriate or a good idea is entirely contextual, but there’s no connection to that negotiation point and the general structure of the round.

See also: Pre-Series A Boards.

Myth / Lie #2Equity rounds require you to close all of your investors at once, instead of with “rolling closings.”

Nope. You can do “rolling closings” quite easily in a seed equity round, so there’s no inherent need to have all of the money rounded up at once. Sometimes investors will place a limit of 120-180 days to do those rolling closings, but other times there’s no deadline and it’s open-ended.

Myth / Lie #3: Equity rounds require you to have a lead investor.

It certainly helps to have a lead investor – someone writing a big enough check, and with their own counsel – to do some light review of the equity docs in a seed equity round, but again there’s nothing inherent in the equity structure that requires it. It’s more about the comfort level of the investors. I have seen “party” seed equity rounds where everyone writes a $50K-200K check. It works fine, particularly now that there are relatively well-known seed equity templates out there that can be referenced and recognized among sets of specialized ECVC lawyers.

Myth / Lie #4: Equity rounds take months to close.

I’ve seen seed equity rounds go from term sheet to money in the bank in 2 weeks. Now that’s definitely on the faster end of the norm, and 3-4 weeks is more common. It’s not lightning fast, but neither is it the dragged-out process that some investors suggest it is. The primary drivers of a lengthier timeline are diligence issues (cleanup) and investor negotiations/delays. Nothing inherent in a seed equity round structure requires it to take a long time, given that well-used templates require minimal customization.

Given how high-stakes the terms you’re committing to in any fundraising are, there is some value in slowing down enough to really know what you’re getting into. See: Negotiation is Relationship Building.

Myth / Lie #5Equity rounds require paying $50-100K in legal fees.

It is true that any equity structure is likely to require somewhat higher legal fees than a SAFE or convertible note round, but seed equity, which is a simplified equity structure relative to full NVCA-style docs (which are more commonly used for Series A and later rounds) isn’t nearly as expensive to close on as some investors suggest. On the leanest end I’ve seen seed equity close for about $10-15K in company-side legal fees, and $5K on the investor side, but more realistically you’re going to be closer to $20K company side and $10K investor side, so about $30K total; possibly higher if you use very expensive firms.

A good ballpark of fees spent from beginning to end for a multi-million dollar SAFE or convertible note round is $2.5K-$5K, so let’s say the delta between convertibles and seed equity is ~$25K in legal fees. The question then becomes, are the positives to closing on a seed equity round worth more than $25K? Very often they are. Easily.

Especially if your investors are asking for a Post-Money SAFE, which has extremely expensive (long-term) anti-dilution mechanics built into it if you end up needing (and likely will) more seed money later, the difference in dilution between a seed equity raise and a Post-Money SAFE can often be multiple percentage points on your cap table. If the difference is 1%, $25K implies a $2.5 million company valuation. If it’s 2%, it’s $1.25 million.

I have seen many companies raising at $10 million, $15 million, even higher valuations in their seed rounds, with multiple million in funding, and yet their investors act as if the extra cost of a seed equity round is so burdensome that the founders should just do a Post-Money SAFE; which in the long-run hands multiple percentage points on the cap table to the seed investors. Basically they are telling founders that they should avoid paying the equivalent of 0.25-0.5% of their enterprise value now in cash for a more hardened, company-favorable deal structure, and instead give 1-2% more of the company as equity (with upside) to the seed investors, which in the long run could be worth millions for the highest-growth companies. That is a horrible tradeoff for the founders.

Translation: “Don’t spend $25K in legal fees now. That’s a “waste of money.” Instead stick to our preferred template and give us 6-7 figures worth of extra equity!”

This isn’t to say that equity is always the right answer for a seed raise. Hardly. Sometimes pre-money SAFEs make sense. Sometimes convertible notes do. I’m a fan of modifying a convertible note to have the economics behave more like equity, but with the streamlined structure of a note; the best of both worlds. And sometimes your investors will demand that you give them a full NVCA suite of docs. Context matters, and so do the numbers.

There’s no universal answer to how you should structure your seed round, because every company is different, and different investors and founders have different expectations, priorities, and preferences. However, not falling for the most common myths and lies that investors give to push you in favor of their preferred structure – which usually is whatever makes them more money – will ensure your eyes are wide open, and you can assess the positives and negatives clearly.