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Lawyers and NPS

TL;DR: Net Promoter Scores provide a clear, simple opportunity for law firms and clients to cut through the obfuscation and marketing nonsense of the legal industry, and understand who really delivers.

From my earliest days of law school, I knew I was going to have a little trouble relating to my chosen profession. Virtually all of my peers were devoting large amounts of their non-class time to something called “blue-booking,” which means learning a bunch of arbitrary rules for proper formatting of citations in legal journals, and “spotting” the errors in a long list of citations; a kind of hazing ritual to get onto a journal. I simply could not get over how the entire thing looked like a spectacularly boring, unproductive waste of my time. I was the only law student in my class at Harvard that I was aware of (I’m sure there were a few others) who never even applied to a journal or law review, and never touched a blue book.  I’ve done alright.

This “WTF are you all doing?” feeling carried on post law school. Moving into a large law firm setting, it was absolutely breathtaking how backward the workflows of lawyers were, and how powerless law firms, as institutions, were to change it. Why are they powerless? Here is my core diagnosis for the “problem” of most large law firms: they are not really firms. Or perhaps better said, no one is really in control. The vast majority of large law firms are decentralized, weakly unified collections of fiefdoms, each controlled by a partner who isn’t truly accountable to other partners, or a central hierarchy. Within a “firm,” a small group of people may have a great idea, or tool, for implementation, but absolutely zero ability to get it adopted firmwide.

Combine that with a power structure concentrated in the hands of (usually) traditional 50 and 60 year olds, and the fact that you usually have dozens of totally unrelated practice groups with independent needs, incentives, etc., and you see that the inertia and inefficiency of law firms is structural and cultural. People who blame the billable hour are focusing way too myopically on one thing, and ignoring the broader, deeper problem. Most law firms are simply too large, too broad, too decentralized, and too lacking in institutional brand power relative to the personal brands of their old school partners to implement needed changes. The only solution, in many cases, is a reset button.

So joining and building out a small boutique firm was my opportunity for a reset button, and I got it, along with an AMEX card to buy what I needed, without having to ask anyone for permission. Starting with a clean slate, and supported by a handful of senior partners with the right mindset, I was able to build a law practice that cut out all the bullshit and delivers what good clients want. What do clients really want, btw? Here are a few examples of what they don’t want:

What isn’t bullshit?

(i) awesome lawyers with specialized expertise,

(ii) who are responsive and DON’T LOSE E-MAILS,

(iii) provide real strategic insight and not just paper pushing,

(iv) are transparent about costs (w/o BS-ing that legal can be cheap), and

(v) can demonstrate their consistent efficiency and quality.

In building out our firm, I searched for a single, objective metric, minimally exposed to BS, for building accountability and clarity around our mission of delivering the above, and I found it: the Net Promoter Score. Our most recently calculated NPS is 77. Apple’s, Amazon’s, and Costco’s NPS range from the 70s and 80s, depending on where you check. Is it as high as we want to be? No. Every year we learn more, and iterate as we scale sustainably. The beauty of NPS, in addition to its simplicity, is how every client’s voice counts. Many law firms have built their brands around the 1% of their clients, with the complaints about slowness, low quality, conflicts of interest, costs, and other issues of the 99% drowned out.

NPS imposes a level of transparency that punishes anyone who isn’t disciplined with what clients they take on, to ensure consistent quality. It actually forces you to focus, because the needs of an unfocused client base are so broad, that you can’t deliver consistency. NPS punishes bloated, unfocused, overly extended scale. 

While we don’t have the structural problems of large firms, we definitely deal every day with the training, recruiting, technological, cultural, and business development challenges of any high-end service provider that handles complex, high-stakes human (as opposed to automated or manufactured) services.  But what matters most is that we have a score for today, for last year, and for next year, to gauge whether we are doing our job, instead of the 100 other things that other people love to talk about, but are not actually our job.

And what I’ve found most interesting, and compelling, is how when you focus your strategy around NPS, the competitive advantages you build are durable. So many of the ways that law firms try to compete in the market can be easily bought: a piece of software, a key lawyer with a big book of business,  a sponsored event where influencers get together, a side deal to a market player in exchange for referrals. But by being purchasable, they’re also easily replicable by anyone else with money.

Delivering scalable, consistent, long-term quality – what results in a high NPS score – is infinitely more complex and time consuming to build, especially when you’re dealing with lawyers. There’s no main “secret” behind what we’re doing. It’s 1,000 little insights and implementations, compounding daily.

My advice to lawyers contemplating starting their own firms is to always, first and foremost, get absolute clarity around (i) what clients they want and don’t want, and (ii) then ask those clients what they want; then start building, and collect your NPS regularly. Focus, and the ability to learn and iterate quickly, is the core strategic advantage of the boutique law firm ecosystem.

And my advice to potential clients when diligencing lawyers is to start out with one question: “What’s your NPS?”  The answer, even if it’s not a number, always speaks volumes.

More Tech Startups are LLCs

TL;DR: Years ago, it was an “obvious” decision for almost every tech startup founder that they would form their company as a “classic” C-Corp designed for venture capital investment. As entrepreneurs have become far more aware of the downsides of VC money with very high-growth expectations, and the diversity and number of tech investors comfortable with LLC investment grows, that is less the case today.

Background Reading:

If you have spent almost any time reading about the basics of startup legal issues, you know that Delaware C-corps are the default organizational structure for a “classic” tech startup (software, hardware) planning to raise angel/VC money and scale. I’m not going to repeat what you can read elsewhere, so I’ll summarize the core reasons in 2 sentences:

Delaware because DE is the “english language” of corporate law and all serious US-based corporate lawyers (and many foreign lawyers) know DE corporate law.  C-Corp largely because (i) VCs have historically favored C-Corps for nuanced tax and other reasons, and (ii) virtually all of the standardized legal infrastructure around startup finance and equity compensation assumes a C-Corp.

However, times are changing. Over the past few years, we’ve seen a noticeable increase in the number of emerging tech companies that, despite knowing all of the reasons why startups favor C-Corps, deliberately choose to organize their company, at least initially, as an LLC. To be clear, C-Corps are still the norm, by far. But the C-Corp / LLC mix has, for us at least, moved maybe from 95/5 percentage-wise to about 85/15. That’s an increase worth paying attention to.

The growth in interest around LLCs has very little, or really nothing, to do with legal issues, in the sense that nothing much has changed about LLCs or C-Corps to drive people in one direction or the other.  The main drivers, from our viewpoint, are:

  • Many tech entrepreneurs no longer view venture capital as an inevitability in their growth path, and have grown skeptical of the traditional “growth at all costs” mindset found in many startup circles; and
  • An increasing number of technology investors are growing comfortable with LLCs.

Profitability is now a serious consideration among tech entrepreneurs. 

C-Corps have 2 “layers” of tax: corporate-level tax, and then tax at the shareholder level. LLCs don’t have a corporate-level tax, and therefore have only 1 layer. Speaking in broad terms, this “disadvantage” of the C-Corp structure has not deterred tech startups for one simple reason: the corporate level tax is on profits, and many tech startups don’t intend to be truly profitably any time soon. Achieving very fast growth through reinvestment of any ‘profits’ has been the dominant growth path among tech entrepreneurs, which means no “profits,” which means being a C-Corp doesn’t really result in more tax.

However, the zeitgeist among startup ecosystems is shifting from “focus on growth, and raise VC” to “unless you’re absolutely positive you’ll raise VC, keep your options open.” Keeping your options open favors starting out as an LLC, because converting an LLC to a C-Corp is way easier than converting a C-Corp to an LLC. The reason for that is simple: the IRS welcomes you with open arms if you choose to move from 1 tax layer to 2. But going in the opposite direction costs you significantly.

As more tech entrepreneurs take seriously the possibility of building a profitable, self-sustaining business, their interest in starting their companies as LLCs is growing, because building a truly profitable business as a C-Corp is much more expensive (tax wise) than it is as an LLC. Many angel investors, and also strategic investors, are comfortable investing in LLCs, particularly under a convertible security structure that doesn’t immediately result in equity holdings.

So starting as an LLC allows you to build your company, and even raise some early capital, while letting things develop to see if you’re really building a business that needs conventional venture capital (and then convert to a C-Corp), or if you’re building one that may instead become profitable and distribute profits to investors (stay an LLC).

VCs are also growing more comfortable with LLCs.

The conventional line given for why VCs “must” invest in C-Corps is that the “pass through” treatment of LLCs can result in various negative consequences to their own investors (LPs), many of whom are tax exempt – so the C-Corp structure prevents the tax problems. However, more sophisticated VCs have realized that in most cases this problem is quite fixable. They can set up what’s often called a “blocker corp” that eliminates the possibility of pass-through income negatively impacting their tax-exempt LPs. Problem solved. It’s not that hard to do.

Truth be told, a lot of VCs still don’t want to mess with LLCs. But at this point it has more to do with inertia and a desire to minimize their own legal bills than any real legal issue. Also, most VCs are only looking for companies in a high-growth track where any net revenue will be reinvested for growth (no corporate profits, no corporate tax), so they are selecting for companies for whom an LLC structure isn’t really that appealing.

But not all VCs think that way. In fact, the types of investors putting money into tech startups has been diversifying significantly. Angel syndicates have grown in size, seed funds have multiplied and grown bigger, with larger checks. And strategic investors now invest very early. Many of these groups are far more comfortable with LLCs than “classic” VCs, because they aren’t as constrained in the types of companies they can invest in.

If you are an LLC tech startup, you need tax counsel.

If you are a tech startup that wants to be an LLC, realize that while LLCs may save you taxes, they will not save you legal fees. Equity compensation, particularly to employees, is much more complex under LLCs, and requires the oversight of true tax lawyers. It is not something to be handled solely by a “startup lawyer.” Any law firm working with LLCs should have access to tax specialists, and if they don’t, that is a red flag.

Also, as startups move from a uniform growth path to one that considers a wider variety of sources of capital (angel, non-traditional seed, strategic, private equity, debt, royalty-based, etc.), they need to accept that the standardization found in conventional Silicon Valley-style fundraising is simply not a possibility. The huge push to standardize investment documentation into templates that can be almost automated stems from the “billion or bust” mindset of classic VC-backed startups. In that world, everyone is a Delaware C-Corp. Everyone is trying to be a billion-dollar company that will eventually get acquired or go IPO. All the angels talk about the same things on twitter and are comfortable investing on the same docs. So just automate a template, plug in some numbers, and focus on growth.

But in a world where everyone isn’t a Delaware C-Corp; everyone isn’t on the same “billion or bust” growth path, and there is far more diversity among companies and investors, the conditions for heavy automation and standardization simply aren’t there, and likely never will be. It requires real financial, tax, legal, etc. advisors to handle real complexity, while right-sizing it for the stage and size of each particular business.

The truth is that outside of a few large startup ecosystems, there has always been much less uniformity among financing structures. Software engineers – frustrated with their inability to force everyone into uniform documentation that can be automated – have criticized this reality as backward and just needing to “catch up,” but to people on the ground it’s been pretty obvious they’re just hammers screaming at everyone to become a nail. More entrepreneurs are no longer comfortable being pigeon-holed into a one-size-fits-all growth path or legal structure, and long-term that’s a good thing for everyone.

“Founder Friendly”

TL;DR: “Founder friendliness” should mean not being hostile, but also not being submissive, to founders. Good entrepreneurs and advisors know that.

Background reading:

Because we’re known as Startup/VC lawyers who don’t represent Tech VCs (just companies), I often get asked about my thoughts on “founder friendliness.” Occasionally it’s someone inexperienced expecting me to say something totally one-sided, as if “founder friendly” means always giving founders what they want. The truth is, I’ve put my fair share of founders in their place, when appropriate. As I’ve written before, company counsel does not mean founder’s counsel.

Serious lawyers provide counsel, and represent something apart from the preferences of any particular person. They don’t just push paper in whatever direction someone tells them to. Real lawyers know when and how to say “no.”

To me, “friendly” means the opposite of “hostile.” It means respecting a person as an equal, being transparent with them, and strongly taking into consideration their own values, goals, ideas, etc.  But that is very different from spinelessly doing whatever they want you to do. The best founders seek out advisors, including investors, who will provide real, critical input; knowing that a bunch of sycophants will get them nowhere.

Founder Hostile

On the one hand, there is very much a culture among certain venture capitalists that treats entrepreneurs as necessary, but ultimately dispensable, steps toward returns. I have seen it firsthand, and while it exists everywhere, it is directly (negatively) correlated with (i) the number of investors willing to write checks into a particular ecosystem, and (ii) the degree to which entrepreneurs confidentially share information among each other on VC behavior, producing adverse selection issues for the real assholes. You very rarely hear about this on blog posts or twitter, but when the pep rallies and PR-oriented speaking panels come to an end, it is there.

VCs in this category vary in the level of sophistication with which they implement their “founder hostile” strategy.  Most know that playing hardball out of the gate won’t get them the deal, and they prefer more of a “bait and switch” approach where they sing the praises of the entrepreneurs upfront, and then slowly move the chess pieces over time. The moves are identifiable by people who know the game:

  • put “captive” lawyers and advisors in place;
  • avoid providing coaching / training resources to founders;
  • tightly control the recruitment of new executives to phase in loyalists;
  • keep a tight grip on unreasonable budgets so that achieving results is very hard, and failure justifies “necessary changes”;
  • maneuver to prevent competitive funds from putting offers on the table;

In the end, it doesn’t matter what the cap table says; it’s “their” company now.

Founder Submissive

On the other hand, in the most competitive deals and ecosystems, there is a counter-dynamic where VCs compete with each other, essentially, on how much unilateral control they’ll give entrepreneurs. This dynamic is strongest in California. It’s, in part, due to the failure of many VCs to effectively apply basic strategic concepts – like differentiation – into their market positioning. If you’re just another VC/fund with a few connections and ideas among dozens of others, what else can you do but try to be the “easiest money”? The end-result of having these “founder submissive” investors is often immature management teams that aren’t able to effectively scale. VCs with real brands are able to avoid this. 

As I’ve written before, a Board of Directors has fiduciary duties to all stockholders. As you’ll read in many different places, the moment an entrepreneur decides to take on investors, they have to step off the “king” train and focus on growing the pie, and eventually achieving an exit, for everyone.

That being said, under DE law Boards have primary fiduciary duties to common stockholders, insiders and outsiders.  As the largest common stockholders (usually), and those who’ve held the equity the longest, entrepreneurs are extremely important representatives on the Board for fulfilling those duties; whether or not they are in the CEO seat.  We know that preferred stockholders and common stockholders regularly have misaligned incentives.  A truly “balanced” Board will prevent one part of the cap table’s incentives and preferences from overriding those of the others.

“Founder hostile” VCs are problematic because they push for the perspective of institutional investors to override those of all the other constituents on the cap table. “Founder submissive” VCs are equally problematic because they expose the company excessively to founders whose priorities may conflict with the economic interests of the broader stockholder base.

The proper balance is, of course, in the middle; where the VCs with the best reputations operate.  Be transparent about your goals, incentives, and plans. Don’t beat around the bush about your investment horizon, exit expectations, and how you’ll approach executive succession when that time comes. Let the common stockholders, including founders, do the same. No BS or opaque maneuvering. And then work together, knowing that no one has the singular right to override the perspective of the others at the table.