Standardization v. Flexibility in Startup Law

TL;DR: Standardization reduces time and fees, but at the cost of increased inflexibility. And sometimes, flexibility matters more.

Related reading:

Imagine you’re about to have a baby. You start asking your OBGYN about the facilities, preparations, etc., and the response you get is: “don’t worry about it, it’s all standard.”

Ok…, but your family has a history of certain unique hereditary conditions. Things can go wrong. You try to prod further. “Don’t worry, everything is going to be standard procedure.”

Are all people “standard”? Well, are all companies?

Standardization has its place, and certainly has its benefits. Those benefits include:

  • Lower Costs (at least upfront);
  • Faster execution, often enabled by technology;
  • Easier review.

In short, standardization makes things cheaper and faster. As great as that is, for any high stakes situation, a half-intelligent person will step back and ask: are speed and low cost really my top priorities here?

The purpose of this post is to discuss why the general push toward standardizing all financing documentation for startups, while clearly lowering up-front legal fees, is not always as “founder friendly” as the automation companies, investors, and other parties who also benefit from standardization, would have you believe. Nothing is free.

As I’ve written before a few times: “don’t ask your lawyers about this” sounds sketchy, and potentially raises red flags. If you want a novice team to simply move on and not ask questions, a real chess player will say “let’s save some legal fees.”

We’re negotiating over millions of dollars with potentially tens or hundreds of millions in long-term implications, but great, let’s save a few thousand in legal fees now by “streamlining” things. Right.

Who chooses the “standard”?

By far one of the most over-used phrases I hear in financing negotiations is “this is standard.” Says who? Do you have data? When you personally close dozens of financings a year across state lines, and have visibility into hundreds, like our lawyers do, it is very amusing when someone who makes maybe a handful of investments a year starts trying to lecture you on what’s “standard.”

The other day I heard a VC say that not having an independent director on the Board post-Series A is “standard,” and virtually everyone else in the room could smell the manure.

If you are looking to adopt market “standards,” make sure they are actually standards. Work with advisors with broad market experience to verify claims, and triangulate advice from multiple, independent advisors. Don’t let anyone simply dictate to you what the “standard” is. 

Serial players benefit from standardization. It’s not about saving companies legal fees.

Investors have portfolio incentives; meaning that they have their bets spread around a dozen or two dozen companies, sometimes much more if they’re a “spray and pray” kind of fund. For investors who look for unicorns, they expect most of their investments to fail, and just need 1 or 2 grand slams to make their returns. Unicorn investors demand very high growth, because even if such an approach can increase the number of failures, it will also maximize overall returns across the portfolio by turning up the juice on the 1 or 2 unicorns.

Entrepreneurs and their employees, on the other hand, have “one shot” incentives. Their net worth is concentrated in one company, and therefore the specific details, and risks, applied to their specific company matter a lot more to them.

The emphasis on very fast, very cheap financings benefits, above all else, large investors with broad portfolios who are looking to minimize their costs on any particular bet. It is not something developed out of beneficence toward companies; who often stand to gain more from adopting structures better suited to their specific circumstances. 

Standardization necessitates inflexibility, and when you’re fully invested for the long-haul in one specific company, flexibility may matter much more to you than simply moving as fast and cheaply as possible.

So who is standardization really for? The people who work in volume.

Lies about fixed legal fees.

One of the worst lies spread throughout some startup law circles is that fixed fees somehow “align” incentives between clients (companies) and lawyers. The argument is that, if lawyers bill by the hour, they will simply bill endlessly without reason. Thus, fixing their fees “solves the problem.”

Except it doesn’t.

Assuming all lawyers are principle-less economic actors who will do whatever maximizes their profits (cynical, but the general argument here is cynical), fixing legal fees does not align incentives between a client and the lawyer; it reverses them.

If Mr. Jerk Lawyer will run up the bill unjustifiably when the economics are hourly, he will, once you fix his fees, reverse course and do the absolute bare minimum necessary to complete the work; pocketing the difference. Why put in that extra hour or two to discuss a few nuances with potentially very material implications to the team, if it just hurts my fixed fee ROI? “This is fine and standard” is a much easier answer. Trust me, the minimum professional standards to avoid malpractice are very low. Close the deal, and move on to the next one.

Oh, but wait, the fixed fee proponent would retort: the fixed fee lawyer will still do a great job because he’s concerned about reputation. Response: (i) isn’t the hourly billing lawyer also concerned about reputation? (ii) you often don’t find out whether the lawyering you got was “good” or “bad” until years later. The difference between great counsel and bad counsel is in nuanced, long-term details not visible at closing. A-players and C-players can both close deals. I’ll let you guess which ones more often agree to fixed fees. 

There is a place for fixing legal fees when the work being done really is commoditized, and not of high strategic significance to a company in the long-term.  But anyone who thinks that fixed fees are some kind of magical solution to long-term lawyer-client relationships is, to put it bluntly, full of sh**. In attempting to solve one problem, they create other ones. So let’s all please stop pretending that when investors insist that you cap your legal fees when negotiating against them that they’re doing it to save you money. It’s a way to get your lawyers to stop talking to you. 

Our view is that clients definitely deserve some level of predictability in their fees, and we provide that by crunching data across our broad client base, and providing clients budget ranges based on that hard data. We also keep clients regularly updated on accrued billings, to avoid surprises. I promise to deliver transparency and data-driven predictability within reason, but I need, and smart clients want me to have, the flexibility to address unforeseen issues that, in my judgment, are material enough to fix, even if I could get away with ignoring them without anyone noticing for years.

Reputation plays a huge role in keeping legal fees reasonable. You’ll go much further diligencing a set of lawyers, asking their clients whether they feel they keep their bills honest, instead of adopting some nonsense idea that fixing/capping fees will magically produce the outcome you really want.

Standardization and Flexibility need to be balanced.

All good startup lawyers adopt some level of standardization, as they should. There is a lot of room for creating uniform practices that save time and money, without damaging quality and flexibility. But any attempts to pretend that complex, high-stakes law can be “productized” should raise serious skepticism, at least from entrepreneurs who view their company as something more than just another cookie-cutter number in someone else’s portfolio.

If I refuse to fix all of my legal fees, it’s because the reality of serious startup law does not fall along some neat bell curve; not when you represent a diverse client base, with diverse goals beyond simply getting as big as possible as fast as possible. There is far more qualitative nuance to strategic lawyering than there is even in healthcare, where the goals are much cleaner, quality is more easily evaluated, and the base structure of each “client” (biology) is more uniform. Business goals are subjective, and the right outcome for one client may look totally different for another, requiring totally divergent, and unpredictable, levels of work. That requires flexibility, both in process and pricing.

Where the final outcome really matters, speed and low cost are not the top priorities. Leave room for flexibility and real strategic guidance, or you’ll move very fast and very cheaply right into a brick wall.

The Board works for the Common Stock

TL;DR: Under Delaware law, the Board’s primary fiduciary duties are to the common stock; not the preferred. That includes Board members who are themselves investors. Keeping that in mind when interests between investors and common stockholders diverge is important for preventing lawsuits.

Background Reading:

Note: For purpose of this post, we’re going to assume Delaware corporate law, because the vast majority of startups are Delaware corporations. States like California, Texas, Colorado, etc. have different laws, although they are not that far off from Delaware (usually).

There are situations in which the “right” thing to do is a black and white, easy to identify issue. But in many other situations, contextual nuances, ambiguity, and human loyalties/incentives make finding an answer more opaque. In those situations, I’ve found that two questions can help provide clarity:

  • Whom do you work for?
  • (and related) Whom do you not work for?

Corporate governance is the broad term for how corporations should be “governed” in the best interests of their constituents. And under Delaware corporate law, it’s a well-known fact that a Board of Directors, which manages the Company at the highest levels, works for the stockholders. The job of a Board of Directors is to maximize value for the stockholder base. 

But which stockholders? Again, we have some ambiguity. Some of the stockholders are sophisticated, repeat player investors holding preferred stock, and the ability to fund (and negotiate) future financings. Other stockholders are first-time entrepreneurs, or employees, with far more of their net worth already sunk in the specific company, in the form of common stock.

Common v. Preferred

As I wrote in Common Stock v. Preferred Stock, anyone who speaks of Common Stockholders (founders, employees) and Preferred Stockholders (investors) as being fully aligned economically either has no idea what they’re talking about, or is deliberately obfuscating the facts, and the relevant case law on the subject. Investors are typically diversified, experienced, advised independently by personal counsel, and have contractual rights that allow them, in certain exit scenarios, to take 100% of exit proceeds. Common Stockholders are typically significantly less diversified, less experienced, reliant on company counsel for guidance, and lacking in contractual preferences on their equity.

In one sense, Common and Preferred stockholders are aligned in desiring for the Company to get as large of an exit as possible. But after that point is made, it has to be acknowledged that between them (distributionally), they conflict in terms of how much risk they are comfortable taking on to achieve that exit, what percentage of exit they will take, who else might join the cap table to share in that exit, when to go for an exit, and any number of other scenarios.

So again returning back to the point made earlier: a Board of Directors works for the stockholders. But there are conflicts between the stockholders. So whom does the Board work for?

Delaware courts give a clear answer: the Common Stock. For those interested, the most commonly cited case on the issue is called In re Trades Shareholder Litigation, although there’s a huge amount of other material available online on the subject.

Yes, all Board members work for the Common Stock; even the directors who are themselves investors and preferred stockholders. That means that, when deliberating on issues for the Company as Board members, directors are supposed to put aside their personal interests, and all the ways in which they might benefit themselves over other stockholders, and do what’s best for the common stock, as a class. And if they don’t, they are open to being sued by common stockholders.

The Job of Company Counsel

Delaware’s answer to whom the Board works for also illuminates what the job of company counsel is: to help the Board do what’s best for the common stock. That includes paying attention to circumstances in which investor directors may be, shall we say, distracted by personal interests in ways that aren’t beneficial to the overall stockholder base.

The job of independent company counsel is, in part, to help a Board of Directors remain mindful of their fiduciary duties to the company’s stockholders, particularly the common stockholders, and to avoid placing itself in situations where they’re exposed to fiduciary duty violation claims.

Because company counsel plays such a key role in corporate governance and keeping self-dealing in check, very aggressive VCs will maneuver to have the company engage lawyers who are “captive” to the interests of the lead investors. I’ve written about this extensively, including in How to avoid “Captive” Company Counsel.

If the job of the Board is to do what’s best for the common stock, and to avoid favoring the preferred, then clearly the last thing a well-governed Board would do is force the company to hire lawyers who have long histories working for the Company’s lead preferred holders. In 90% of Boards I work with, this is seen as an obvious, plain as daylight fact; the Company should hire independent lawyers. Outside of the startup/VC world, it would be seen the same way by 100% of Boards.

But there’s still that 10% of funds (bad actors) who use any number of excuses for putting captive lawyers in the counsel seat. And yes, I have seen lawsuits, both against investors and against lawyers, result from parties playing those kinds of games. Piss off the wrong stockholder, and leave enough evidence, and you won’t like the outcome. 

When Boards don’t do their job

It’s one thing to say that the Board’s job is to represent the best interests of the common stockholders, and not take actions to enrich the investor base at their expense, but ensuring that it actually gets done is a whole other issue. Again, there are many funds out there who care deeply about their reputation, and try hard to fulfill their fiduciary duties. But every serious corporate lawyer knows of the tactics that bad actors will use to push through their agendas, often with thinly veiled arguments about why they are best for the company. Some examples:

  1. Telling management that they should not be talking to outside investors (who might offer competing terms, or more competitive valuations), because it is “distracting” and they should “focus on the business.” Or that they simply “aren’t ready” for fundraising yet, despite the fact that the company will run out of cash without getting talks going.
  2. Making up reasons why their preferred lawyers / firm will offer favorable economics (lower cost) to the Company if they are engaged, and using cost savings as a reason why it’s best for the company.
  3. Running executive recruitment processes without the involvement of founders/existing management who are Board members, citing that they prefer not to distract them. The end result being that their loyalists end up getting hired, and not other candidates.
  4. Insisting that their preferred “independent” director choice be elected, despite clear loyalty issues, and holding up other key decisions until they are put in place.
  5. Using made-up data to impose onerous budget constraints on the Company, unless management “gives” on other issues they want.

Unfortunately, once you’ve allowed an asshole onto your Board, it takes constant vigilance and offense/defense to counter the many tactics they might use to push the Company in directions that increase their power and ownership, without actually benefiting the company overall.  Sometimes you have no choice but to go down that path.

But without a doubt, the best thing a team can do to ensure their Board stays aligned with its fiduciary duties is to avoid bad actors altogether, and that takes diligence before any checks are written. All money is green, but some of it is rotten.

As I wrote in Local v. Out of State VCs and Ask the Users, as startup ecosystems become more transparent and open, relying less on one or two dominant funds, the value of diligencing the reputations of investors goes up significantly.  VCs rely heavily on their reputations for deal flow, and there are many good players in startup ecosystems who will use reputational information to either push more deal flow toward VCs who play by the rules, or penalize bad actors. 

I have seen companies go deep into talks with Fund A, and then choose to go with Fund B primarily based on very negative feedback they received, off the record, from entrepreneurs and other market players who know how Fund A worked. Reputation is powerful. Use it.

Key takeaways to wrap this up:

  • The job of a Board of Directors is to do what’s best for the common stockholders of the Company, and not enrich or empower themselves at the common’s expense.
  • Even with that fact, bad actors will use shady tactics and excuses to push companies to do things that favor the VCs over the remainder of the stockholder base.
  • Your best defenses are (i) do diligence to find out who the bad actors are, and avoid their money if you can, and (ii) hire independent advisors who will hold their ground against bad actors during Board meetings.

Negotiation and Inexperience

TL;DR: Having access to trusted advisors, and the time to consult with them, is essential for anyone negotiating terms with which they have very little experience. Don’t accept someone’s argument that you must negotiate important issues live. It’s simply untrue, and a tactic for gaining unfair leverage.

Background Reading:

A recurring theme of SHL posts is that entrepreneurs, particularly first-time entrepreneurs, need to be extremely mindful of the imbalance of experience between themselves and the many sophisticated, repeat players they’re going to be negotiating with as they build their companies. It’s obviously common for entrepreneurial personalities to be more comfortable (than most) with risk, and to go head-first into negotiations and activities without proper backup. But for really big, irreversible decisions, it will backfire, and others will happily use it against you.

One of the most overused phrases for getting naive negotiators to give in on issues they should push back on is “this is standard.” When you have no historical or market perspective – what’s normal, what’s fair, what are the risks, how will this play out in 5 years? – you can be easily manipulated into all kinds of bad outcomes. I’ve been at more than my fair share of board meetings or negotiations where someone at the table makes a completely biased, nonsensical claim that something is “standard,” at which point I’ve had to step in to set things straight, and gladly offer up data or a quick market survey.

There are two main things that I tell all companies to focus on in this regard:

  1. Have a group of experienced, trusted advisors that you can quickly communicate with on serious issues.
  2. Do not let yourself be bullied into a setting where your inexperience puts you at a substantial disadvantage.

Trusted Advisors

When I speak of trusted advisors, I’m not referring necessarily just to your Company’s “advisory board,” which serves a broader purpose of helping you on long-term strategic, business, and technological issues. I’m referring to people you can call or e-mail for specific, tactical guidance on more pressing matters; your “inner circle.” Seasoned entrepreneurs, mentors from accelerators, lawyers (who are independent from your lead VCs), and trustworthy angel investors often make up this group for most CEOs I work with. The most important thing is that they (i) have visibility into the broader market, to help you actually understand what is acceptable, and (ii) will be direct and honest with you when you most need them to.

Imbalanced Negotiation Settings

While it is far less common in the tech world than in other areas, you occasionally still encounter people (particularly VCs) who insist that the only appropriate way to “really” negotiate is live, and in person. And let me tell you: this is bullshit.

Of course, live discussion is important for communication and relationship-building; it has its place. But more often than not, attempts to force entrepreneurs and company executives to negotiate key issues live, or under a very tight deadline, is a tactic to gain unfair leverage from their inexperience. Of course the guy who’s done this type of deal 30 times wants you to agree to terms live, face to face, away from your set of advisors. It has zero to do with business norms. Plenty of high-stakes deals are negotiated asynchronously. 

How you push back and (respectfully) assert yourself in negotiations with other business parties will set the tone for your long-term relationship. If you allow them to force you into circumstances that favor them, they will do it indefinitely. There is nothing wrong with responding, diplomatically, that while you of course would love to grab beers and meet up in person for more casual matters, for real business, you expect time to consult with advisors.

If you’re working with people whom you should want to build long-term relationships with, they will respect your request.  In fact, I’ve known some great VCs and other business people who are very upfront about the experience imbalance with new entrepreneurs, and insist that companies work closely with key advisors.  Those are people playing a long game, and who know that their reputation in the market matters more than short-term opportunism.

If the person you’re negotiating with rejects your request, and dictates to you the medium of negotiation, then at a minimum you’ve gained some key information on what the relationship is going to really look like if you choose to move forward.

Founder Burnout and Long-Distance Thinking

TL;DR: “Life ain’t a track meet; it’s a marathon.” – Ice Cube

I’m prone to deep thinking about life. It’s why I quit the honors program in a great business school within weeks of entering college, and switched to Philosophy (adding Economics later). Best career decision of my life. No offense to the business school grads out there.

I’ve always had this feeling that people devote far too much brainpower toward things that ultimately amount to nonsense, and yet things that are infinitely consequential – like what you want to do in life, where and how you want to live, who and when to marry, whether and when to have kids – people seem to either follow a script, or just let their surrounding culture/peers push them in the direction of the current zeitgeist. And the truth is, the zeitgeist doesn’t give a shit about you. Slow down, and think it through. You get one shot.

And instead of asking your friends, ask people who’ve gone the distance. It’s well documented culturally / sociologically that spending all of your time with people your own age leads to all kind of mental dysfunctions and myopic thinking. The only way to get real perspective is to listen to other perspectives, and that means age / generational diversity.

A lot of the advice out there on founder burnout amounts to a kind of checklist on health and wellness. Let’s go ahead and get that checklist out of the way:

  • Sleep – Don’t delude yourself into thinking that pulling all-nighters and not hitting your 7/8 hour a day quota will make you more productive. It won’t. The data is clear.
  • Exercise – Same. Go for a run. Lift some weights. It’s not time wasted. Again, it makes you more productive.
  • Eat well – Eat shit, and you’ll feel like shit. Read up on carbohydrates, insulin, inflammation, and energy. You’ll learn some things.
  • Delegate – Build systems, and then hand those systems over to other people. If you can’t figure out a way to scale your skills, you will fail at life and at work.

But in my opinion, and from what I’ve observed among certain entrepreneurs, there’s a deeper, longer-term issue at play regarding founder burnout (and life burnout in general) than just getting overworked and not taking care of your body. The best way I can explain it is using some old school philosophy concepts: higher and lower pleasures.

Speaking very generally, lower pleasures require constant replenishment, because the feeling they generate just doesn’t last. They’re the “simple carbs” of life. Sex, drugs, and rock n’ roll are the typical go-to’s when someone wants to explain lower pleasures, but lots of cleaner forms of activities in life fit this category. Once they’re over, all you’re left with is a memory, and a desire for another one.

In contrast, higher pleasures have a kind of lasting effect. They have staying power and can bring satisfaction to life even when you’re not at the moment “doing” anything about them. Long-term friendships, love, family, and a sense of meaningful (not just financial) achievement are all classic examples of higher pleasures. They can be entertaining (or the opposite) and take up your time, but that time is a kind of investment toward building something that carries you forward in life, and is still there when you’re in your 40s, 50s, 60s, and later. David Brooks wrote a good op-ed called The Moral Bucket List that is worth reading.

The deeper kind of life burnout that goes beyond health/wellness results from years, or even decades, of failing to build durable “higher” pleasures into your life. You can ensure that you’ve slept enough, exercised, eat well, and have built a great management team, and yet at 40, 45, 50, find yourself sipping martinis on Christmas Eve, alone, or with someone who means absolutely nothing to you. That end-result really burns, because there’s no checklist for resolving it. Fail to build/invest into things in life that last and will help you really go the distance, and it can eat you alive in the long run.

When asked by young law students about how to vet law firms for employment, I’ve always said to look at the older partners, and watch/listen very closely. Look for divorces, kids in therapy, anger management issues, drug addiction, alcoholism. In the legal profession, and in all areas full of high performance personalities – including entrepreneurs – they’re everywhere. People who treated life like it’s a track meet – narrow your vision and run as fast as you can – when it’s really a much longer, much more intricate marathon.  Rock stars in their earlier years, but they failed to go the distance.

So my personal advice to ambitious entrepreneurs about preventing burnout long-term is, yes, sleep, exercise, eat well, and delegate, but also build a real life, not just a company. Emphasis on the word build; as in, activities that contribute to relationships and things that will be there tomorrow, and next year, and a decade later, when you’re a different person, with different priorities. Look ahead, and plan for the distance.  Most of the people around you telling you to just “keep hustling” care more about your stock than they do about you personally, or are themselves ignoring how long the marathon is.

Look for mentors who’ve built their own companies, but while maintaining a sense of balance (even if loosely defined).  Even if zen-like balance isn’t really achievable, the simple act of trying hard to achieve it will ensure you land somewhere sustainable. Like a speed limit, you know you’ll break it, but it’ll still help pace you.  

Think things through, and spend some of your time really building a life, apart from your company. The building may take longer than just narrowing your goals and running as fast as you can, but the end-result will be something much more durable. 


TL;DR: Post-employment non-competes are generally not enforceable in California. Given how much content around tech entrepreneurship originates from California, you might get the impression that not having non-competes in startup employment agreements is the norm across the country. You’d be wrong.

The whole non-compete debate in tech circles is fun to watch. Certain people try to paint it in simplistic “good v. bad” terms. The champions of innovation who believe “talent should move freely,” v. the traditionalist ogres representing entrenched BigCo’s. But as you’ll hear me repeatedly say on this blog: watch incentives. Where you stand depends on where you sit. 

Imagine for a second that we’re sitting in a God-like seat, where we can push the population of a country in one of two directions.

Option A: People will have more babies, but die sooner.

Option B: People will have fewer babies, but live longer.

Now imagine there’s a debate among two sets of constituents as to which option should be pushed forward. The first group are the people currently living in that country. The second group are foreign shareholders in a conglomerate that sells (i) baby clothes, and (ii) coffins. Think there’s disagreement?

Get my point? Maybe a “Hunger Games” metaphor would’ve worked better. I’ll elaborate.

Ecosystem v. Individual Incentives

The debate over non-competes has a few core elements to it. First, it pits ecosystem v. individual incentives, which I’ve discussed in a few places on this blog. I’m fairly confident that if you remove the ability for employers and employees to agree (voluntarily) to have non-competes in their employment docs, the end-result is more companies and more bargaining power for employees (obviously); which is to say, it probably does net-out to faster ecosystem growth.

But if I’m an entrepreneur who has already started a company, I give far far more shits about the specific company I’ve sunk my sweat and tears into than about your “ecosystem.” Your ecosystem is not going to produce an ROI on my “one shot” investment.

However, if I’m a venture capitalist, angel investor, or run an accelerator, my ROI is tied to the ecosystem; I have portfolio, not “one shot” incentives. I benefit from incentivizing hyper-competition and the creation of new companies, even if it threatens the existence of those who are currently working on their “one shot.”

ps, it also increases the need for capital to fund talent wars. Watch incentives.

From an evolutionary perspective, you better believe it would help the human species if people died sooner and reproduced more. You also better believe the people currently alive might have a slightly different perspective on the matter.

So putting aside moralizing judgments, everyone discussing the non-compete issue needs to first acknowledge the reality of their misaligned incentives.


Secondly, because so many people on the entrepreneurial/employer side, particularly in Silicon Valley (where there is an extremely^2 competitive labor market), are so concerned about being seen as “that awesome person/company that just LOVES employees and you really really really should want to work for,” there is very much a reluctance to speak honestly on this issue. You’ve got companies offering doggy daycare and daily massages to try to hold onto their roster. They sure as hell aren’t going to go on the record saying “yeah, it would be nice if we could have non-competes.”

So it doesn’t surprise me that most of the public content on the issue involves people grandstanding about the values of innovation, disruption, free talent flow, etc., and how they support outright bans on non-competes. The law (in California) is already there – they can’t have non-competes, and that’s not changing – so why on earth would I counter its logic publicly, when deviating from the script will hurt my recruiting efforts?

There’s a very similar dynamic going on here with the 90-day exercise period on employee options. Putting aside the legal and tax nuances around it, so much of the public content coming out of SV on it paints it as total BS and just a way for employers to “screw” employees.


  1. Asking employees to commit to a 1-year non-compete is just employers “screwing” employees. Nothing more.
  2. Asking employees to exercise their options within 90 days of leaving the company, or forgo the equity, is also employers “screwing” employees. Nothing more.

Is not offering doggy day care “screwing” employees as well? Asking for a friend, in California.

“Non-competes and employee option expiration are outrageous! We’d NEVER do that to employees!”

Translation: “We’re hiring! Chef-prepared veganic meals daily. All you can drink Soylent.”

Employers (including current entrepreneurs) have wants and needs. Employees have wants and needs. Startup investors have wants and needs. And many of them conflict. Acknowledging it, instead of finger-pointing and grandstanding, makes debate possible.

Humanize the Issue

I’m very much a fan of humanizing complex business issues; which to me means distilling them down to basic norms and ethics of human interaction. It’s easy to get caught up in cold business calculus when you talk about “employers” and “employees,” instead of reducing the issue down to people simply bargaining with each other.

Say I’ve spent years building up a family restaurant, with all of my special recipes, business contacts, processes, etc., and I invite you to come work with me. I’m going to teach you everything about the business; all of my secrets. But to ensure I can trust that you aren’t just going to take everything I teach you and use it somewhere else, I ask you to agree not to compete with us for a year if you leave.

Am I an asshole? Or am I simply protecting myself somewhat from betrayal. I can think of lots of human scenarios in which this kind of bargain is perfectly acceptable and reasonable. And with my libertarian tendencies, I don’t feel comfortable with the government dictating that me and my prospective employee can’t simply agree among ourselves what the right bargain is.

And now we’ll have the necessary rebuttals.

But this isn’t about family restaurants, Jose. This is about Google and Apple trying to keep powerless employees from choosing where they want to work.

Is it really? You think the Pre-Series A entrepreneur with 10 employees isn’t exposed to a key employee walking with everything she’s learned and taking it somewhere else?  There are valid arguments for why non-competes need to be right-sized for the circumstances, and why perhaps very large corporations shouldn’t get the same benefits from them as smaller businesses. And also that lower-level staff should get more freedom than employees closer to core IP/trade secrets. Courts already think about them this way.

And let’s also stop playing the violins for a second. Are today’s tech employees, especially in startup ecosystems, really powerless?

But confidentiality provisions and other IP protections still protect companies, even without non-competes.

Trust me, it is 100x as expensive to prove in court that someone stole your trade secrets than it is to point to a paragraph in an employment agreement and be done with it. Google and Apple have the resources to fully enforce their IP confidentiality. Most small companies / startups do not. Today, total banning of non-competes may help Goliaths more than Davids.

But removing non-competes requires employers to hold onto their employees in other ways.

I get it. Government reduces the power of an employer, so the employee now has more leverage. Employee therefore gets better treatment. Wonderful. But the point of this post is that employees aren’t the only people in the business ecosystem that matter, and there are valid arguments on the other side that are worth hearing.

Non-Competes are the Norm. 

Outside of California, non-competes are the norm, and they can be valuable, among the many other bargaining mechanisms, between employers and employees. They can help provide a foundation of trust, which allows employers to invest in their employees for the long-term.

Maybe you’re so gung-ho on the total free flow of talent and “ecosystems” that you absolutely want to forgo non-competes. That’s perfectly fine. Every company is different, and has its own culture. But at least understand why your counterparts at other companies may think differently about the situation, and offer alternatives. That’s how healthy labor markets are built.

The right answer on non-competes probably lies somewhere in the middle of the two polarized sides. On the one hand, it is definitely unfair for a powerful 20,000 employee behemoth to be able to restrict even a secretary from working at a competitor. I think we can all agree on that, and the courts already do. But that doesn’t mean the same rules should be applied to the key employee at a 10-employee startup.

On the other hand, there is a valid argument that the level of hyper competition in Silicon Valley is not something other ecosystems should try to totally replicate. It may lead to talent wars, which waste resources on frivolous perks, and require larger rounds of capital. It may also hurt the ability of companies to invest in their talent for the long-term, because they’re constantly worried about that talent being bought out by a better capitalized competitor.

We should all agree that there are valid points to be made on both sides, and valid disagreement as to what a “healthy” startup ecosystem really looks like. The grandstanding and obfuscation of misaligned incentives is the problem.